It is ironic that the potential expansionary effects of fiscal contractions have become known as non-Keynesian effects. This paper highlights the fact that 
Introduction
The potential for fiscal contractions to have expansionary effects has been seen as more than a theoretical curiosity ever since Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) attempted to explain the events that took place in Ireland and Denmark during the 1980s. 1 As the 1990s progressed the Expansionary Fiscal Contraction (EFC) hypothesis attracted increasing attention in the literature. Initially, the emphasis was on the theoretical considerations, e.g. Blanchard (1990) , Drazen (1990) , Bertola and Drazen (1993) , Barry and Devereux (1995) and Sutherland (1997) . These theoretical papers were followed by a set of empirical papers that tested the EFC hypothesis in a variety of cross-country studies, e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995) , Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) , McDermott and Westcott (1996) , Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) , and Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) .
There are a number of noteworthy features about the manner in which the literature developed. First, there were attempts to explain the hypothesis within the traditional macroeconomic models that up to this point were used to explain why fiscal contractions should have no effect or a contractionary effect. Second, in the standard pattern of most scientific work, the literature moved away from the almost case study approach of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) to examine if the hypothesis might be more universally applicable. Third, there was little emphasis on the search for a precursor to the EFC hypothesis in the literature on economic thought. The purpose of this paper is to supplement the existing research by 3 examining a case study that illustrates that there is a history of economic thought on the issue. Our argument is that John Maynard Keynes, Alfred Pigou, Lionel Robbins, Josiah Stamp and Hubert Henderson, in their deliberations on the Economic Advisory Council's Committee of Economists were aware of the potential perverse effects of fiscal policy.
The political and economic environment of Britain in 1931 that prompted the deliberations of these economists displays many parallels with that of Ireland in 1987. What is different is that Keynes et al identified the potential for an EFC before it actually happened, whereas the later literature was written after the event.
The next section outlines the recent literature on the Expansionary Fiscal Contraction Hypothesis. Section 2 identifies the similarities between the economic and political environment of the UK in the early 1930s and Ireland in the 1980s. Section 3 then presents the foresight in the Report of the Committee of Economists about the possible perverse effects of fiscal policy.
Hindsight: Recent Theory and Evidence on the EFC Hypothesis
At around the same time as Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) appeared in the literature there were a couple of studies dealing specifically with the Irish EFC (McAleese 1990; Barry 1991; Geary 1992; Honohan 1992; Mawdsley 1995; Bradley and Whelan 1997) . However, the primary focus of the literature following Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) horizons. In other words, a fiscal contraction had a contractionary effect. A increase (decrease) in taxes in period j accompanied by an offsetting decrease in taxes in period u made those individuals alive in period j poorer (wealthier). The size of the wealth effect depended on the probability of surviving from period to period and the time difference between period u and period j. In order for a fiscal contraction to have a positive wealth effect something else is needed. Two distinct explanations of the direct wealth effects are provided in the literature.
First, there are explanations that depend on threshold effects. In these explanations fiscal contractions increase the expected wealth of individuals because they avert larger negative consequences (Blanchard, 1990; Sutherland, 1997) . Second, there are explanations that depend on a contraction in the size of the public sector (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Barry and Devereux 1995; 2 Barry and Devereux 1996) . Blanchard (1990) examined a fiscal contraction where taxes are increased, changing fiscal policy from unsustainable to sustainable, and thereby, avoiding a forced future fiscal contraction that would have resulted in an increased tax rate that would have a distortionary effect on output. The individuals' expected wealth increases because the expected forced fiscal contraction, with its associated distortionary tax rate, was avoided.
Similar threshold type effects were explored by Sutherland (1997) . Like Blanchard (1985) , Sutherland examines a change in the time profile of taxation.
However, there are important differences between the change in the time profile of taxation specified by Sutherland and that specified by Blanchard (1985) . In the Blanchard model the tax changes are small, known, and offsetting, with the only uncertainty surround the life of the individual. In Sutherland's paper the timing of tax changes are unknown and potentially much larger. Sutherland allows the debt to GDP ratio to follow a random walk within upper and lower bounds. When one of the boundaries is reached there is a large 1-period wealth transfer between the private sector and the government in order to bring the debt to GDP ratio towards its mean level. The result is that for Sutherland fiscal contractions are contractionary when the debt to GDP ratio is away from the threshold but expansionary when the ratio is close to the threshold. In other words, "non-Keynesian" effects dominate close to the threshold while Keynesian effects dominate away from the threshold. Perotti 
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Whereas Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997) use threshold effects to derive an EFC, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) , Barry and Devereux (1995) , and Barry and Devereux (1996) derive an EFC by reducing the size of the public sector. By reducing both sides of the government's intertemporal budget constraint, individuals' are wealthier because they pay less tax. In the majority of these studies government expenditure is neither productive nor enters into the individuals' utility functions.
The decrease in the present value of taxation results in an immediate expansion in consumption. While it is the contraction in the size of the public sector, both expenditure and taxation, that drives the expansionary effects, it is classified as a fiscal contraction because of the timing of the changes. For example, the fiscal contraction is achieved in a number of ways: starting the decrease in expenditure before the decrease in taxation or increasing taxation in period t followed by decreased taxes in subsequent periods such that the overall reduction in taxation matched the decrease in government expenditure.
It might be noted at this stage that the channel through which an expansionary effect is produced. It was through an increase in wealth and consumption. Later it will be explained that for Keynes and his contemporary emphasis the investment channel was seen as the important one for confidence. Turner (1991) found a lack of empirical support for wealth effects from fiscal policy during the period. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Devereux (1995 and 1996) . If one interprets these papers as saying that cuts in government expenditure signal future cuts in taxation then testing if fiscal contractions composed primarily of expenditure cuts produce expansionary effects is one method of testing the EFC hypothesis. Support for the hypothesis that the composition of the fiscal contraction is important for expansionary effects is presented in Alesina and Perotti (1995) , McDermott and Westcott (1996) , Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) , and Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 3 All of these studies involved examining over 17 OECD countries for periods of 25 years or more prior to the mid-1990s. However, Giavazzi, Japelli and Pagano (2000) and Giorgioni and Holden (2003) found evidence that tax cuts were more important than expenditure cuts.
Another strand of the literature suggests that it is the size of the fiscal contraction that was important in signalling future fiscal policy (Drazen 1990; Bertola and Drazen 1993) . Many of the studies cited above found it was the composition rather than the size of the fiscal contraction that was important. Some studies did find that the size of the fiscal contraction was important for producing expansionary effects Other possibilities can be found in survey papers like Ardagna (2004) and Briotti (2005) . In this respect, this paper suggests that there is much to be gained from an occasional re-examination of episodes from economic history where there appeared to be an EFC. The particular episodes examined in this paper are the events in 
Similarity in the Events Separated by Over Half a Century
Throughout the 1980s Ireland struggled to control imbalances on the public finances.
The first sustained attempt to correct the situation took place between 1983 and 1986. While the success of this first fiscal adjustment is debated (Dornbusch, 1989 and Honohan, 1992) it is beyond doubt that it was not accompanied by expansionary effects. This first fiscal adjustment was undertaken by a Fine Gael -Labour coalition government with Alan Dukes as Minister for Finance. The situation in
Ireland had deteriorated to such an extent that control of the public finances became the primary target of fiscal policy. In particular, the target was the non-capital budget deficit called the Current Budget Deficit (CBD). The policy instruments used to achieve the target were tax increases and cuts in capital expenditure. The tax increases proved counter-productive, discouraging investment, distorting the labour market and encouraging vast levels of tax evasion and avoidance. The capital expenditure cuts did not enter into the calculation of the CBD. The result was that while the government managed to reduce the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (EBR) to GDP ratio, the CBD/GDP and public debt/GDP continued to increase until 1986. The Prime Minister of the time, Garret FitzGerald, now accepts that his government's choice of the current budget deficit as the target for fiscal policy was ill advised and it would have been better to target the EBR (FitzGerald, 1995) .
While any ex-post evaluation of the government's policy would conclude that it was unsuccessful at achieving its own targets, a bigger problem at the time was that the policy haemorrhaged credibility from the beginning. As Minister for Finance, Alan The consensus view on the recovery that occurred in Britain in the 1930s is that the recovery was triggered by both the devaluation and the confidence effect engendered by the policy of budget balance, and that it was continued by the boom in housing and houshold durables driven by cheap money after the conversion of the War Loan (Hicks 1939 and 1952; Worswick 1984; Richardson 1962; Richardson 1983) . The significance of maintaining budget balance was important for two reasons. First, Snowden's statements on the potential for enormous deficits unless action was taken made the balancing of the budget seem like there was a fiscal contraction. Although what exactly 'balancing the budget' actually implied is not easy to ascertain given the treatment of the Sinking Fund.
Second, the prevailing fiscal orthodoxy was budget-balance, therefore, to plan a deficit would have had greater significance than it might decades later.
The purpose of tracing this thumbnail sketch of the similarities between the British and Irish experiences is to highlight the economic environment and context within which economic thinking was taking place. While it would be easy to list the temporal and size differences between the episodes it is the similarities that are of importance here. In both cases the confidence effects of fiscal discipline were supplemented by the impetus of devaluation and lower interest rates. In both cases the improvement in the political position of the Minister with responsibility for budgetary policy was important. In both cases, the successful fiscal contraction was introduced by a Minister that commanded overwhelming political support in his legislative chamber.
The British experience has never been classed as an example of an EFC. This might be because the significance of the fiscal measures in the recovery is 
Foresight: Keynes and the Committee of Economists
On the journey back to 1930 it is instructive to stop at one point. balances here hold a similar belief, such a campaign may check a drain of gold abroad, and so help money income. These reactions may be large enough to make the net effect on employment favourable. Thus it is not certain that in the first stages of the 1930 panic the Government's economy campaign was a mistake. But few economists would now deny that it was maintained too long" (Pigou 1950:40-1, emphasis in original) .
This passage was published 20 years after the Report of the Committee of
Economists was published and 14 years after the General Theory was published. 4 In this passage Pigou confirms Keynes's argument, its applicability and its acceptance when he says that "Nobody doubts any longer that Keynes's argument … is not only correct on his premises, but is also applicable in a general way to the conditions of the actual world". However, he makes a crucial qualification when he says that if it is believed "that the country is going to the dogs on account of extravagant consumption, an economy campaign may restore confidence" and that the overall reaction "may be large enough to make the net effect on employment favourable". Pigou identifies the investment channel as the one through which the expansionary effects flow rather than the wealth and consumption channels favoured by those using the Blanchard (1985) model. As will be demonstrated later, the emphasis on investment is consistent with Keynes kept everyone on board by getting individuals to draft the sections of the Report on which they held strong views. This strategy was stretched to the limit in the case of Robbins. Keynes allowed Robbins to agree to draft the opening section of the Report and allowed him to include a statement, at the end of the Report but before the Statistical Appendix, outlining his difficulties with aspects of the Report. When the Report was published on October 6 th , it was a surprisingly coherent document despite all the disagreements and the fact that different individuals had drafted different sections.
For the purposes of this paper, the remarkable feature is that there seemed to be little disagreement on the importance of budgetary discipline for business confidence. In the first section, dealing with home investment, the second sentence says, "[s]o far as home investment is concerned, we would put in the forefront the restoration and maintenance of a state of business confidence" (Moggridge 1981:443) While the Report stated that " [t] he best means of restoring business confidence is a psychological problem on which the opinion of this Committee is not likely to be specially valuable" (Moggridge 1981:443-4) , it continued to say that in the short run some measures could be taken to aid the process. It is worth quoting the first two of the four stimuli suggested. Keynes was the one member of the Committee that did not have budget balance as his primary concern. His emphasis on public works rather than budget balance lies at the heart of his disagreements with Henderson. This is not to suggest that
Keynes did not believe that there were important consequences on confidence arising from budgetary balance, or the lack or it. Rather it was a matter of priority 21 and emphasis. Keynes emphasised the importance of a public works programme for a positive shift in the marginal efficiency of capital. Henderson believed Keynes did not attach enough importance to the negative effects that his proposal would have on the same schedule via the budgetary situation. To suggest that
Keynes was taking these possibilities likely is not to imply that he did not accept their potential existence. Clarke (1998:164) Consumer expectations being more important to later contributors, while investor confidence was more important to earlier contributors. Regardless, and to paraphrase Pigou, a fiscal contraction will have expansionary effects if it is believed that it will stop the country going to the dogs.
Timing is everything. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) What this paper demonstrates is that the clash of ideas presented in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) surfaced previously. However, at the previous point in time
Keynes was struggling to get his ideas on to the agenda. The Report of the Committee of Economists clearly identified the importance of budgetary policy on investor and consumer confidence at a time when Keynes was advocating the expansionary possibilities of a public capital programme. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) had the opposite problem. They needed to convince their peers that the indirect confidence effects could outweigh the direct contractionary effects of policy.
This paper also demonstrates that there are some remarkable similarities between the economic and political environments of Britain in 1931 and Ireland in 1987.
While the similarities, rather than the differences, are emphasised here, there are enough similarities to suggest that the UK experience might prove another useful case study in the circumstances under which a fiscal contraction might be expansionary.
